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STATE FARM MUTUAL ATUOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY

*
*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
NATURE OF CASE

Plaintiff brouqht this action in the District Court of Cache
County, Civil Action No. 2177? against the Defendant for declaratory relief claiming that the Family Exlusions Provision of the
insurance policv issued to the Defendant, Thomas Lavton Mastbaum,
excuses the Plaintiff from defending the Defendant, Thomas Lavton
Mastbaum, in a civil action filed aaainst him by his wife
resulting from an automobile action on May 30, 1981, near Garden
Citvf Utah.

A civil action filed in the District Court of Cache

County, entitled Kathleen Marie Mastbaum v. Thomas Layton
Mastbaum, Civil no. 21668, is civil action seeking damages for
injuries sustained to Mrs. Mastbaum resulting from the above mentioned accident.

Plaintiff, State Farm, further sought declaratory judgment
in this separate suit seeking determination that the insurance
policy in question does not provide coverage for the benefit of
Kathleen Marie Mastbaum and that the Plaintiff had no duty to
adjust or to pay the claim which may be awarded in her favor in
such litigation. Civil No. 21668.
Defendants Mastbaums1 Counterclaim in this action asserting
that the Family Exclusion Provision of insurance contract and the
Doctrine of Interspousal Tort Immunity was violative of public
policy in general and violative of public policy behind the Utah
Safety Responsibility Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-2-4?
and Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 11.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The District Court of Cache County rendered a Summary
Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants
upholding the validity of the Family Exclusion Provision of the
insurance contract in question.

That the suit filed by Mrs.

Mastbaum against Mr. Mastbaum, Civil No. 21668, is barred because
of the doctrine of Interspousal Tort Immunity and the Family
Exclusion Provision.

Summary Judqment on both issues was entered

by the Court in favor of the Plaintiff and against the two
Defendants on the 2fith of Januarv, 1984.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the Judgment entered by the ^rial
Court.

That an order of this Court be entered determining that

the Family Exclusion Provisions of the insurance contract of the
Plaintiff in the policy issued to the Defendant, Thomas Layton
Mastbaum, be determined violative of the public policv of the
State of Utah and violative of public policy behind the Utah
Safety Responsibility Act, UCA 30-2-14, and Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 11, and that the Court further enter its Order
that Utah follow the modern trend of authorities in declaring the
doctrine of Interspousal Tort Immunity does not exist in the
State of Utah,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about May 9, 1983, the Defendant, Kathleen Marie
Mastbaum, as Plaintiff, filed civil action against her husband,
Thomas Layton Mastbaum, as Defendant, in the District Court of
Cache County, Civil No. 21668.

In the Complaint Mrs. Mastbaum

alleges that her husband/Defendant was the driver of an automobile in which the Plaintiff was a passenger.

That Defendant,

while under the influence of intoxicated liquor, drove the said
automobile into an oncoming vehicle near Garden City, Rich
County, Utah, on Mav 30, 1981, when the Plaintiff sustained severe
personal injuries including a broken back.

Mrs. Mastbaum further

claims permanent injuries. The Defendant, Thomas Lavton Mastbaum,
at the time of the accident had an insurance policy with the
Plaintiff/Respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company.

The Plaintiff/Respondent, .State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company filed an answer to the above suit and then commenced this separate action for declaratory judgment, which

Complaint was filed in the District Court of Cache County, Utah
on or about the 14th day of June, 1983, seeking to avoid responsibility for payment of any sums due to Mrs. Mastbaum and seeking
the declaration of the Trial Court that the Family Exclusion
Provision of the insurance contract was valid and enforceable,
and, Plaintiff/Respondent was not responsible to defend the
Defendant in Civil action no. 21668 or pay any damages or make
any settlement in connection therewith.

The Defendants,

Mastbaums in their answer asserted affirmative defenses and
counterclaims.
The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff
on or about the 26th day of January, 1984 on both issues. That
on the 21st dav of February, 1984 notice of appeal was filed with
this Court by Defendants.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY IS VIOLATIVE OF
PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THEREFORE IT DOES NOT BAR
KATHLEEN MARIE MASTBAUM'S SUIT AGAINST HER HUSBAND, THOMAS LAYTON
MASTBAUM IN CIVIL ACTION NO. 21668, DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH.
The Doctrine of Interspousal Tort immunity is based upon
the archaic common law notion that a wife had disabilities which
prevented her from suing and being sued.

This perception of the

wife's disabilities was based upon a fiction that a husband and
wife were one,

and that the wifefs individuality during marriage

became merged in that of her husband.

All of her personal pro-

perty which the husband could reduce to possession during
marriage became his, and he had the right of possession, management and control of her real estate.

During marriage she could

not sue for damages to her person or property but such suits were
brought in the name of the husband and any damages recovered
belonged to him. (See Stoker v. Stoker 616 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah
1980) quoting from Cooley's Blackstone, Volume 1, Book 1, Chapter
15 page 294.)

Under that concent the wife could not sue her hus-

band because of the procedural difficulty which would require the
husband to sue himself, and also because she would acquire no
substantive right against him since he would be the owner of whatever he recovered in the suit.
697 (Utah 1954.)

(Taylor v. Patten, 275 P.2d 696,

Thus, prior to the adoption of the Married

Women's Acts, the common law view was that upon marriage the

husband and wife became one, and she could not sue that entity of
which she was a part.
Under Utah's Married Women1s Act, this antiquated view of
the wifefs legal rights is done away with.

U.C.A. §30-2-4 (1953

as amended) states that:
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor,
maintain an action therefor in her own name and hold
the same in her own right, and may prosecute and defend
all actions for the preservation and protection of her
rights and property as if unmarried. There shall be
no right of recovery by the husband on account of
personal injury or wrong to his wife, or for expenses
connected therewith, but the wife may recover against
a third person for such injury or wrong as if unmarried,
and such recovery shall include expenses of medical
teatment and other expenses paid or assumed by the
husband." (emphasis added)
Defendant submitsf that the above-quoted statute as interpreted
in Stoker v. Stoker 616 P.2d 590, 591, clearly states that the
Doctrine of Interspousal Immunity is violative of public policy.
Plaintiff strongly contends that under Rubalcava v. Gisseman,
14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963), the Interspousal Immunity
Doctrine is still applicable to nonintentional tort cases between
spouses.

However, Plaintiff seriously overlooks the affect of

the Stoker case on the Rubalcava case.

The Court in Stoker 615

P.2d at 590, stated that in:
••»Rubalcava v. Gisseman and the Union Pacific Railroad.,
this court held the statutes considered Taylor v. Patten
did not compel the conclusion tort actions should also
be included in the abrogation of immunity, with actions
on contracts and prooerty matters. We do not agree,
(emphasis added)

Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the Stoker case from the
Rubalcava case by saying Stoker dealt with intentional torts.
No where in Stoker does the Court make that distinction*

In

fact, as stated above, the only place in Stoker that Rubalcava
case is cited is in the same paragraph with Taylor v. Patten, 2
Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954), which was an intentional tort
suit between spouses. Therefore, in Stoker, Supra, at 590, the
Court inferred that it did not agree with Rubalcava (an unintentional tort case), and that "tort actions" should also be
included in the abrogation of immunity.

Thus, overruling

Rubalcava v. Gisseman.
In support of its overruling Rubalcava v. Gisseman, the
Court in Stoker v. Stoker further declared at 592:
Our holding today reaffirms the Legislative abrogation of Interspousal Immunity. That the trend in
our sister states is certainly in consonance with our
holding today: See 92 A.L.R.3d 901, at p. 923, et seq.
The court unequivocally held that interspousal immunity had been
abrogated.

No distinction was made between an intentional or

unintentional tort as plaintiff contends.
In reference to the Utah's Married Women's Act, supra, the
Court in Stoker, 616 P.2d at 591 stated:
The statute authorizes her to prosecute and defend
all actions for the preservation and protection of
her rights and property, as if unmarried. It speaks
of rights and of property in the disjunctive, and, all
actions for the preservation and protection of her
rights would certainly include a right to be free
from an intentional tort of her husband,
(emphasis added)

Plaintiff in its memorandum in the Trial Court states that
the Court in the Stoker case created "some confusion" on this
issue.

Plaintiff asserts that the Rubalcava case stands for the

point that U.C.A. §30-2-4 does not allow a wife to sue her husband, only third parties.

As stated above Stoker v. Stoker

overrules Rubalcava, but a careful reading of Stoker v.Stoker at
591, shows the court held that U.C.A. §30-2-4 speaks of the
wife's rights and of property in the "disjunctive."

In

interpreting the statute's language, which speaks of rights and
property in the disjunctive, the Court was holding that the statute uses the phrase "rights and property" in the alternative.
Therefore, "no confusion" exists as asserted by Plaintiff because
just as "all actions for the preservation and protection of her
rights would certainly include a right to be free from an intentional tort of her husband," so too it should include a right to
be free from a negligent tort of her husband.

The Court in

Stoker held that the statute authorizes her to prosecute and
defend "all actions" for the preservation and protection of her
rights and property as if unmarried, which certainly would
include a negligent tort committed by her husband on her.
To further support its holdinq that the Interspousal Immunity Doctrine has been abrogated, the Court in Stoker v. Stoker,
supra, cites two sections of the Constitution of Utah:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and

no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defendant
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party. (Article I,
Section II, Constitution of Utah.)
The court states that the Married Women's Act "was enacted
with full knowledge" of these two provisions.

Therefore, as the

Constitution sets forth "All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedv by due course of law, which shall
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay."

Since the

Legislature enacted U.C.A. §30-2-4 (1953 as amended) "with full
knowledge" of these Constitutional provisions, then the wife
should not be denied remedv for an injury, even if that injury
was caused by her husband.
In Stoker the Court further stated that the Married Women1s
Act is in "derogation of the common law." The Court then quoted
U.C.A. §68-3-2 (1953 as amended) which controls how a statute in
derogation of the common law should be construed,

The statute

reads:
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation
thereof are to be strictly construed has no apolication
to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish
the laws of this state resoecting the subjects to which
they relate, and their orovisions and all oroceedings
under them are to be liberally construed with a view
to effect the objects of the statutes and to oromote
justice, whenever there is anv variance between the
rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference
to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
In applying the above-quoted statute the Court at 591 held that:

To read into our Married Women's Act, a proscription
against a wife suing her husband, would be to construe
it so strictly as to add a provision which the legislature did not put there.
Therefore, by not allowing defendant in the present case to
bring suit against her husband for his tortious conduct would also
be construing the Married Women's Act too strictly, which would
add a provision that the legislature did not put there.

Also, by

denying defendant's action because of the antiquated common law
Doctrine of Interspousal Tort Immunity, the Court would not be
applying U.C.A. §68-3-2 (1953 as amended) properly.

Under U.C.A.

§68-3-2 (1953 as amended) the statutes (Married Women's Act) are
to be liberally construed "with a view to effect the objects of
the statutes and to promote justice." Certainly, justice and
equity would be achieved by allowing defendant's suit against her
husband.
The Court's interpretation of U.C.A. §30-2-4 (1953 as
amended) in Stoker is in direct contravention of the court's
earlier ruling in Rubalcava.

In Rubalcava, 384 P.2d at 392, the

Court states that "as will appear below in analyzing our statutes,
no basis can be found therein for any distinction between intentional or unintentional torts."

Further, the court went on to

construe the Married Women's Act as not allowing the wife a right
to sue her husband, but only extending to her the right to sue
third persons.
In culmination of this direct conflict between Stoker and
Rubalcava, the Stoker court at 592 held:

The old common law fiction is not consonant with the
realties of today. One of the strengths of the common
law was its ability to change to meet changed conditions.
Herer the Legislature did not wait for the common law to
change, it made the change for it; and did so at a time
when a great many of Utah's sister states were enacting,
or had previously enacted, Married Women's Acts. Our
holding today reaffirms the Legislative abrogation of
Interspousal Immunity. That the trend in our sister
states is certainly in consonance with our holding
today: See 92 A.L.R.3d 901, at p. 923, et seq.
(emphasis added)
Plaintiff in its Trial Memorandum correctly asserts that
changes in the Interspousal Tort Immunity Doctrine should be
accomplished by the Legislature.

As stated in Stoker the

Legislature did not wait for the common law to change, "it made
the change." Also, the Court stated that its holding "reaffirms
the Legislative abrogation of Interspousal Immunity."
Defendant asserts that the archaic common law doctrine of
interspousal immunity has been invalidated by the Legislature as
expressly held in Stoker, therefore, defendants suit against her
husband for his tortious conduct should be allowed.
Finally, Plaintiff in its Trial Memorandum gave great weight
to Justice Crockett's dissenting ooinion of Stoker.

This is fine

if an understanding of the law before Stoker is desired, but if an
understanding of the present law and its affect is desired, the
court in this case should look to the actual law as decided in the
majority opinion of Stoker.

POINT II
THE PUBLIC POLICY GROUNDS OF PRESERVING FAMILY HARMONY AND OF
PREVENTING FRAUD AND COLLUSION DO NOT JUSTIFY THE APPLICATION OF
THE INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN THE PRESENT CASE.
In Rubalcavay Supra, the court noted that the two most
widely accepted public policy grounds for retaining the doctrine
of interspousal immunity were:

(1) preserving family harmony,

and (2) that where insurance is involved, collusion between
spouses would be encouraged.

Defendant contends that these were

proper policy reasons to support interspousal immunity twenty
years ago in the Rubalcava case. But under the Stoker case, the
antiquated view of public policy reasons supporting Rubalcava is
done away.

In Stoker the court expressly states that it is

following the trend in its sister states, which is "in
consonance" with its holding by citing with approval 92 A.L.R.
3d 901, at p. 923 et seq.

(Stoker v. Stoker 616 P2d at 592).

A brief review of the cases of sister states which were
cited with approval in the A.L.R. annotation and "in consonance"
with Stoker will support defendant's contention that family harmony and a danger of collusion are not persuasive arguments for
the retention of interspousal immunitv.
Cases found in 92 A.L.R. 3d 901, at p. 923 et seq., which
support the argument that interspousal tort immunity is not
effective for presentation of marital harmony are hereafter cited.
In Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972), which was a
negligent tort case for personal injury, the wife's suit was not

barred by interspousal immunitv.

In itfs holding the Court in

Freehe reasoned that the motion that a suit for tort damages
would destroy the peace and tranquility of the home is a
"conclusion without a basis."

The Court expressly rejected the

notion that family peace and tranquility is a valid reason for
precluding a cause of action in tort against the tort-feasor
spouse.

To support its holding the court in Freehe at 774 stated:

If a state of peace and tranquility exists between
the spouses, then the situation is such that either
no action will be commenced or that the spouses—who
are, after all, the best guardians of their own peace
and tranquility—will allow the action to continue only
so long as their personal harmony is not jeopardized.
If peace and tranquility is nonexistent or tenuous to
begin withf then the law's imposition of a technical
disability seems more likely to be a bone of contention
than a harmonizing factor.
Defendant contends that the Intersoousal Tort Immunity
Doctrine is counterproductive to marital harmony.

If a spouse

is not allowed to collect damages for a tortious wrong committed
by the other spouse then it is "more likely to be a bone of contention than a harmonizing factor.

(Freehe, Supra.)

One of the

strongest policies in our society is the Preservation and
encouragement of marriage as an institution.
ships are, in fact, contrary to Utah law.

Illicit relation-

If a spouse is not

allowed to sue the other spouse for tortious actions, then this
would not encourage or oreserve marital unitv or marriaqe as an
institution, but would be a "bone of contention", or encourage
some individuals not to marrv at all. For this reason, Plaintiff's
contention that interspousal immunity maintains marital harmonv

is in direct contravention of that socially desirable result.
Along this same line, the Arizona Supreme Court in Fernandez
v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878 (Ariz. 1982), abolished the Doctrine of
Interspousal Tort Immunity in automobile accident cases.

In

support of its holding, the Court considered the argument of
maintaining interspousal immunity to preserve family harmony,
stating:
We doubt however, that family harmony will be damaged
any more by allowing a suit for the negligent infliction
of injury upon a spouse than the damage that will be
done if the injury goes unredressed.
The Court further stated that the threat to marital harmony
is small when there is the existence of liability insurance.

The

Court compared the disruption of family harmony in a suit between
spouses and a suit between parent and child, and stated:
Secondly, we cannot ignore the almost universal existence of liability insurance, particularly in the
automobile accident realm. Where such insurance exists,
the domestic tranquility arqument is hollow, for in
reality the sought after litigation is not between
child and parent but between child and parent's
insurance carrier. * * * Streenz v. Streenz, 106
Ariz. 86,88,471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970).
We do not believe, considering the existence of automobile accident insurance, that the family harmony or
domestic tranquility will be harmed by allowing suit for
injuries.
Therefore, Defendant asserts that as in Fernandez v. Romo
there is no danger of domestic discord by allowing this suit.
Here, as in Fernandez, liability insurance exists and as is
evident by the verv fact of this suit the litigation is not between husband and wife, but between wife and husband's insurance

carrier (Plaintiff).
Defendant contends that under U.C.A. §30-2-6, (1953 as
amended) husband and wife have the right to sue each other concerning property; also under Stoker v. Stoker, supra, husband
and wife are permitted to sue each other for intentional tort
damages.

Therefore, these actions are "as likely to bring about

conjugal discord, as are actions for personal torts, yet only
personal tort claims have been precluded upon the ground that
they would shatter the harmony of the family."
528 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Nev. 1974).)

(Rupert v. Stienne,

Thus, defendant encourages the

court to allow her suit because it is difficult to perceive how a
personal action would disrupt the tranquility of the marital
state to any greater degree than would actions in property,
contract or intentional tort.

(See Rogers v. Yellowstone Park

Company 539 P.2d 566, 569 (Idaho 1975).)
Other cases so holding that marital harmony is not preserved
by the doctrine of interspousal immunity are: Crammer v. Cramer,
379 P.2d 95,96 (Alaska 1963); Klein v. Klein 376 P.2d 70 (Cal.
1962); Self v. Self 376 P.3d 65 (Cal. 1962); Courtnev v. Courtney
87 P.2d 660 (Okl. 1938).
Each of the above-mentioned cases concerning marital harmony
also considered the argument that the Interspousal Immunity
Doctrine prevents fraud and collusion.

Plaintiff asserts that

without spousal immunity that would lead to fraud and collusion,
especially where an insurance company is involved.

(Rubalcava

(Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra, at 390.)

This analysis, however,

betrays an attitude of mistrust toward the American Judicial
System.

In Fernandez v. Romo, 882 Supra, the Arizona Supreme

Court said:
The idea of a husband and wife rising from the marriage
bed, eating breakfast, and drivinq in the same automobile
to court where, aided by their respective attorneys, they
will testify against each other, does little to enhance
the perception of justice and leads to a suspicion of
collusion and fraud. We think the courts can control
this, however, and the attorneys for the insurance
company will, we are sure, be quick to detect and bring
to the court's attention any evidence of collusive conduct
by the parties.
In Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Nev. 1974) the
court stated:
However, to deny one spouse the opportunity to recover
from the tortious conduct of the other because of the
possibility of fraud and collusion, belies the centuries
old trust in our jury svstem. An interspousal tort claim
should not be saddled with the presumption of fraud ab
initio. Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okl. 395, 87 P.2d 660
(1938). Our adversarv system will ferret out the non
meritorious claims and dispatch those who would practice
fraud upon the courts.
The Court in Freehe v. Freehe, supra, at 775 also discussed
the argument that abrogation of the doctrine would allow fraud
upon the Court of collusive actions.
[We reject] this "pessimistic premise" notinq that "this
line of argument presupposes that courts are so ineffectual and the jurv svstem so imperfect that fradulent
claims cannot be distinguished from the legitimate." 500
P.2d at 775.
That court also noted:
Collusion in one class of cases than another does not
warrant courts of law closing the door to all cases of
that class. Courts must depend on the efficacy of the

judicial process to ferret out the meritorious from the
fraudulent in particular cases. Id. at 775.
The Idaho Supreme Court in the Rogers v. Yellowstone Park, supra,
followed this same logic:
We reject this contention, for courts in this state
presently weed out fraud and collusion in other cases
not involving actions between spouses. We find nothing
unusual or peculiar in interspousal suits to frustrate
the capability of the judicial system to avoid or
anticipate such abuses. 529 P.2d at 569.
Therefore, Defendant contends that neither of the rationales
of maintaining marital harmony and Dreventing fraud and collusion
are valid public policies for disallowing her suit.

Defendant

submits that if her suit is denied on these grounds th§n she will
have no remedy.

If her suit is denied then the only remedies

available would be the inadequate remedies of divorce or criminal
law.

The Washington court in Freehe v. Freehe, supra, at 774

speaking of the remedies of divorce or criminal law stated:
It has been observed that neither of these alternatives
actually compensate for the damage done, or provides
anv remedy for the nonintentional neqligent torts. . .
We have previously observed that while "a criminal
action may be adequate to prevent future wrongs. . .
it certainly affords no compensation for oast injuries."
To these reflections we add the observation that linutinq
the injured partv to a divorce or criminal action aqainst
his or her tort-feasor spouse is quite inconsistent with
any policy of preserving domestic tranquilitv. Thus the
argument base^ on suqgested legal alternatives simply
does not withstand analvsis.
Tn conclusion defendant urqes this Court to reverse the
Trial Court and allow Mrs. Mastbaum suit aqainst her husband.

As

the late Justice Travnor so aotly stated, "the fictional unity of
husband and wife has been substantially violated bv overwhelming

evidence that one plus one adds up to twof even in togetherness.
Thus, one spouse may recover against another in tort.M

(People

v. Pierce, 395 P.2d 893, 894 (Cal. 1964).)
POINT III
THE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE CONTAINED IN PLAINTIFF'S
INSURANCE POLICY IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS IT IS VIOLATIVE
OF PUBLIC POLICY UNDER UTAH LAW.
The family exclusion clause in question is contained in
Plaintiff's insurance policy, under Section 1 "Liability
Coverages."

The policy provides the following:

THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY UNDER: (h) COVERAGE A
["Bodily injury sustained by other persons"], TO
BODILY INJURY TO ANY INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF THE
FAMILY OF AN INSURED RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD
AS THE INSURED. (Emphasis contained in policy)
This family exclusion clause is representative of the tvpical
clause used bv insurers. All insurers commonly insert this type
of clause within their policies to limit their liability.

In

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Kay, 26 Utah
2d. 195, 487 P.2d 852 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court held that
such clauses were valid and not violative of public policy
because they avoid collusive suits, and thev protect the insurer
from the burden of defendinq a tort-feasor who is related to the
Plaintiff.

Defendant submits that even though the abovementioned

case is currentlv thought to be the law in Utah concerning family
exclusion clauses, recent case developments have shown that
public policy has shifted and that Mrs. Mastbaum's suit should
not be denied because of the family exclusion clause.

In State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v, Kay, supra
at 856, Defendant Kay asserted the argument that the household
exclusion clause was void as a matter of public policy on the
ground it was arbitrary and had no valid legal purpose. The
Court rejected defendant's argument by relying on the language
and holding of a Washington case, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 467 P.2d 189 (Wash. 1970).

The primary

language from Phillips which the Utah Supreme Court cited with
approval stated:
The exclusion in question is a so-called "household or
family exclusionary clause", the purpose of which is not
only to protect insurers from collusion which might
possibly arise in intrafamily suits but also to protect
them from the natural tendency of one insured to strengthen
or enlarge the case against him when it involves members
of his household and family. There is a natural disposition to favor those in onefs household and close
members of onefs family. The practical impossibility
facing an insurer in defending such an action is readily
apparent, and explains why this tvpe of exclusion is
inserted in a policy.
This rationale of Phillips became adopted in Utah in Kay.
Defendants contend the rationale that the Court in State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v. Kay, supra, adopted from
t le

*

Phillips case is no longer valid as public oolicv.

It is

important to note that the Washington Supreme Court realized the
invalidity of this rationale and overruled Phillips in Mutual of
Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 62?, P.2d 1234 (Wash. 1^80).

In

Wiscomb, which was a case verv similar factually to the present
case, the Court carefully analyzed the stated policy in Phillips
of allowing the family exclusion clauses to prevent collusion,

and to protect insurers from the natural tendency of insureds to
enlarge the case when it involves a member of onefs family.

The

Washington Court stated that "as a private contractor, the
insurer is ordinarily permitted to limit it's liability unless
inconsistent with public policy of statute."

Wiscomb, supra. The

Wiscomb Court held that the family exclusion clause was violative
of public policy, and not supported by the rationale of preventing collusion of burden on insurers of enlarqing the case.
The Court in Wiscomb found that the traditional rationales
for the exclusion clause were not supportive of their continued
existence.

Citing Freehe v. Freehey 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972),

which was decided after the Phillips case.

The Court then stated

at 500 P.2d 775:
The courts may and should take cognizance of fraud and
collusion when found to exist in a particular case.
However, the fact that there may be greater opportunity
for fraud or collusion in one class of cases than
another does not warrant courts of law in closing the
door to all cases of that class. Courts must depend
upon the efficacy of the judicial processes to ferret
out the meritorious from the fraudulent in particular
cases.
The Court further states:
Tn Freehef the Court rejected the notion 'that courts
are so ineffectual and the jurv system is so imperfect
that fraudulent claims cannot be distinguished from
the legitimate.' Freehe v. Freehey 81 Wash. 2d 183,
189, 500 P.2d 771 (1972) quotinq Goode v. Martinis,
58 Wash. 2d 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961). That reasoning
seems equally applicable to this issue.
Defendant's contention that collusion will run rampant in
the area of interspousal immunity absent family exclusion clauses

demonstrates an attitude of mistrust towards the judicial system.
Defendant submits that the courts will be able to ferret out the
meritorious from the fraudulent claims in most cases just as they
do in other cases not involving interfamily suits.
Plaintiff's assertion that the household exclusion clause
should be allowed to afford protection to the insurer from collusive suits of family members is "wholly unpersuasive because the
exclusion far exceeds the evil which it is designed to protect
against; collusion and fraud are the exception rather than the
rule."

(Wiscomb, supra)

The family exclusion clause effectively

closes the door to all types of cases in that class justified
solely because there mav be a greater opportunity for fraud or
collusion (Freehe, Supraf at 775).

Defendant contends that this

is why the collusion argument submitted bv Plaintiff is unpersuasive.

Defendant contends that this Court should follow the

Wiscomb rationale and follow the modern trend of public policy
that Utah has shifted towards allowing intrafamilv torts to be
actionable at law.
POINT IV
UTAH'S SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT TS A DECLARATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY VOIDING THE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE.
It is the Plaintiff's contention that the family exclusion
clause (cited at page 19 infra) allows the Plaintiff to avoid
liability coverage and the responsibilities of defending an
action brought bv a member of an insured's household.

Such a

position, however, cannot be reconciled with policy declarations
of the Utah Safety Responsibility Act, U.C.A. §41-12-1 et seq.
(1953 as amended).
The Utah Safety Responsibility Act requires motorists to
carry insurance against loss resulting from liability imposed bv
law for injuries suffered by any person.

U.C.A. §41-12-21(b)(2)

is typical of such all-inclusive language:
(b) such ownerfs policy of liabilitv insurance:
(1) (. . .)
(2) shall insure the person named therein and any
other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle
or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission
of such named insured, against loss from the liabilitv
imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or motor
vehicles within the United States of America or the
Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of
interest and costs, with respect to each such motor
vehicle, in the amounts specified in §41-012-1 (k) of
this Act. (emphasis added)
In State Farm v. Kav, supra, the Plaintiff finds some refuge
in the language of that case regarding a familv exclusion clause.
Nevertheless, since the Kav case was decided the trend, both in
case law and through legislative enactment, has been to the
contrarv.

The Utah No-Fault Insurance Act, U.C.A. §31-41-1 et

seq. (1953 as amended), passed subsequent to the Kay case, mandates that an insurer provide statutory miminum insurance
coverage.

District Court, Judge Omer Call, in a similar case as

this, has held in a Memorandum Decision dated June 1, 1982 (Civil
No. 16765 Box Elder County, Utah) that:
The requirements of the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act,
incorporating provisions, relating to qualifications

of insurance policies, of the Utah Safety Responsibility
Act, establish a minimum liability coverage requirement
of $15,000 per person, $30,000 two or more persons. The
policy issued by plaintiff with it's "household or
family exclusion clause11 is void after those minimum
coverage requirements, but is enforceable as to coverage
in excess thereof.
(See the opinion in Estate of Neil v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange,
566 P.2d 81, (Nev. 1977) which Judge Call expressly followed.)
It is the defendant's position in this case that not only
should the family exclusion clause be held void as to the minimum
coverage requirement but should be held void in its entirety.
(Emphasis Added)
A number of courts have held that a Financial Responsibility
Act similar to the one enacted in Utah effectively voids a household or family exclusion clause because such clauses are inconsistent and violative of public policy as expressed in those
acts.

In Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,

236 N.W.2d 870, 882, 884 (1975) the North Dakota Court construed
a nearly identical familv exclusion clause to be void stating:
"The basic puroose for the legislature's enactment of
financial resoonsiblitv laws was to nrotect innocent
victims of motor vehicle accidents from financial
disaster.
The Court went on quoting from a North Dakota legislative report
which stated:
Financial responsibility laws have as their objective
the compensation of innocent victims of traffic
accidents, ^hus, thev are more concerned with the
solution of economic problems created bv traffic
accidents than with the orevention of traffic accidents,
(emphasis added)

This type of economic reasoning was followed in Atlantic National
Insurance Company v. Armstrong, 416 P.2d 801, 805, 806 (Cal, 1966)
wherein the Court said:
A primary purpose of financial responsibility laws is
to protect 'that ever changing and tragicallv large
group of persons who while lawfully using the highways
themselves suffer grave injury through the negligent
use of the highway by others.' (cites omitted) This
goal is no less subverted bv limiting the class of
persons whose injuries are compensable than by limiting
the class of drivers who are insured. Either tvpe of
exclusion forces the injured person to rely exclusively
upon the financial resources of the driver or owner in
seeking compensation for his injuries.
See also Stevens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, 519 P.2d 1157 (Ariz. ADO. 1974).
Policy holders also have a reasonable right to expect protection and full coverage from their insurance comoany.

In a

recent decision the Montana Supreme Court held that:
...the household exclusion clause is invalid due to
its failure to fhonor the reasonable expectations' of
the purchaser of the policy.
The Court went on to quote from Keeton, "Insurance Rights at
Variance with Policv Provisions", 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 967
(1970) as follows:
The objectively reasonably expectations of applicants
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of
insurance contracts will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy Provisions would
have negated those expectations.
The Court then found that the insurance policy was an "adhesion
contract" to be strictly construed against the insurance company.

In dealing with almost identical family exclusion language,
a State Farm policy in Hughes, supra, at 885 was also found to
be an adhesion contract.

The Court said:

In interpreting the terms of a policy of insurance,
we are guided by the familar rule that, as an adhesion
contract drawn by the company, it must be construed
most strongly against the insurance company. (cites
omitted)
The North Dakota Court went on to quote from Continental Casualty
Company v. Phoenix Construction Company, 296 P.2d 801 (Cal. 1956)
which stated the governing principles for motor vehicle liability
policies:
It is elementary in insurance law that anv ambiguitv
or uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved
against the insurer... . If semantically oermissable,
the contract will be qiven such construction as will
fairly achieve its object of securinq indemnitv to the
insured for the losses to which the insurance relates... .
If the insurer uses language which is uncertain any
reasonable doubt will be resolved against it; if the
doubt relates to extent or fact of coverage, whether
as to oeril insured against... , the amount of liability.. ,
or the oersons or persons protected.. , the language
will be understood in its most inclusive sense, for the
benefit of the insured.
In the automobile insurance context, often aoolication for
insurance is made and later, if approved, the actual policy is
forwarded to the insured without his ever havinq a chance to
preview it. This is normally a one-sided transaction with the
insured having little or no bargaining power.

For this reason,

courts have stated as a qeneral principle of law that insurance
contracts are adhesion contracts.

A most recent statement to

this affect was made in General Motors Acceptance Corporation v.

Martinezy No. 18072 (decided May 24, 1983) wherein the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
Credit life and accident insurance are generally
contracts of adhesion which are not negotiated at
arm's length and which usually contain various
provisions for protection of the interests of the
insurance company.
Given the express public policy in the Utah Financial
Responsibility Act and the No-Fault Insurance Provisions enacted
into statute, and in consideration of the adhesive characteristics
of insurance contracts, the family exclusion clause in question
herein should be declared void and without effect by this
Honorable Court.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it is apparent that the Doctrine of
Interspousal Tort Immunity has been overruled in the State of Utah
or this Court in this decision overruled the same as violating a
public policy of the State of Utah and has no application in the
State of Utah.

That this Court further hold that the family

Exclusion Provision of the Plaintifffs insurance contract violates
the public oolicy of the State of Utah and is violative of the
public policy behind the Utah Safety Responsibility Act, 30-2-4
UCA 1953 as amended, and Article I, Section 3 1 of the Utah
Constitution.

That the Trial Court be reversed in this matter

and that the Defendants be allowed to proceed with the suit presently pending in the District Court of Cache County, Utah, filed
as Civil No. 21668, and the Plaintiff herein be required to

defend the Defendant, Thomas Lavton Mastbaum said suit and be
required to respond to any damages that may be awarded Mrs.
Mastbaum against her husbandf Thomas Layton Mastbaum, for which
he was responsible resulting from the automobile accident of May
30, 1981 near Garden City, Utah.

That the Defendants herein be

awarded their costs accordingly.
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